Arms embargo are a tool to prevent the illicit transfer of arms and weapons. They are often imposed by international organizations or individual countries to signal disapproval of an exporter’s policies and galvanize other states to oppose such unwanted policies.
But a number of factors undermine the effectiveness of arms embargoes. First, arms are durable goods with long lifespans. Conventional weapons can be repurposed and re-exported after their use by an embargoed actor, or reverse-engineered and replicated from spare parts. As a result, arms exports are rarely stopped once they have been introduced to conflict zones; instead, the weapons remain available for decades.
Then, a lack of national controls on international arms transfers makes it difficult to monitor and enforce embargoes at the point of origin. Fragile states in particular are unable to perform this crucial function, as weak institutions and low capacity to deliver services diminish citizen faith in their government and create power vacuums that fuel factionalized elites and militias.
Finally, multilateral arms embargoes inherently suffer from collective action problems, as the individuals responsible for implementing them may defect from a shared effort to protect their own interests. This weakens the overall coercive power of the embargo and leaves each defection as a powerful deterrent to further enforcement.
Arms smuggled into embargoed zones typically enter through sea (by sea-going vessels) or land, either by vehicle or via cross-border concealed carry, also known as the “ant trade” where small quantities of weaponry are transported across borders like individual ants in a colony. The more entry points that embargoed actors have to access these shipments, the tougher it is for the UN and Member States to intercept them. This is especially true when illicit shipments are intermingled with, or moved along the same routes as, legitimate cargo.